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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Bridgett Lee Deluca appeals from the order revoking her probation and 
ordering a previously imposed sentence executed. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Deluca with possession of a controlled substance and 
felony injury to child. (R., pp.29-30.) Following an amendment by the state, 
Deluca pied guilty to possession of a controlled substance and misdemeanor 
injury to child. (R., pp.79-85.) The district court sentenced Deluca to a seven-
year unified sentence with the first three years fixed and retained jurisdiction for 
180 days. (R., pp.91-93; 8/10/2009 Tr., p.58, L.7 - p.59, L.18.) Additionally, the 
district court imposed 120 days jail on the injury to child conviction, to be served 
concurrently. (R., pp.91-93; 8/10/2009 Tr., p.59, Ls.19-22.) Following Deluca's 
completion of the retained jurisdiction program, the court suspended her 
underlying sentence and placed her on probation for seven years. (R., pp.103-
104; 12/13/2010 Tr., 14, L.21 - p.16, L.17.) Approximately seven months later 
an agent's warrant of arrest was served on Deluca alleging her continued use of 
methamphetamine, refusal to cooperate with her probation officer, and an 
association with "known felons/absconders/drug dealers" was a violation of her 
probation. (R., p.111.) At her probation violation hearing, Deluca admitted to 
being in violation of her probation by failing to submit to a probation search and 
continuing to use methamphetamine. (R., pp.123-126; 12/06/2010 Tr., p.18, L.8 
- p.20, L.3.) 
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Prior to Deluca's disposition hearing, her attorney suggested that the court 
order an updated mental health evaluation: 
MR. TABER: Your Honor, I was also thinking that maybe an update 
of the mental health evaluation might be in order. 
THE COURT: I don't see any indications that would make 
that a good idea. 
MR. TABER: She tells me that's what her probation officer-
THE COURT: No, I'm not going to order any additional 
reports at this stage. I don't see any basis for it, based on my 
review of the file. I will see you on Friday. 
(12/13/2010 Tr., p.22, L.23 - p.23, L.8.} At disposition, the court revoked 
Deluca's probation and ordered her original sentence executed. (12/17/2010 Tr., 
p.82, Ls.7-8; R., pp.160-162.} Deluca subsequently filed a Rule 35 motion for 
reduction of her sentence, seeking leniency, supplemented by multiple letters of 
support from friends and family. (R., pp.163-177.) Concluding Deluca's 
sentence "was fair," the court denied her request for leniency. (R., pp.185-188.) 
Deluca timely appealed. (R., pp.178-180.) 
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ISSUES 
Deluca states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion pursuant to I.C. § 
19-2522 when it failed to order a mental health evaluation of Ms. 
Deluca prior to her probation violation disposition hearing? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion pursuant to I.C. § 
19-2524 when it failed to order a mental health evaluation of Ms. 
Deluca prior to her probation violation disposition hearing? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. 
Deluca's probation? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. 
Deluca's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of 
Sentence in light of new information indicating that there is a nexus 
between Ms. Deluca's mental health issues and her substance 
addiction? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Deluca failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by 
denying a request for an updated mental health evaluation prior to Deluca's 
probation violation disposition hearing? 
2. Has Deluca failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by 
revoking her probation? 
3. Has Deluca failed to establish the district court erred by failing to reduce 
her sentence? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Deluca Has Failed To Establish The District Court Should Have Ordered An 
Updated Mental Health Evaluation Prior To Her Probation Violation Disposition 
Hearing 
A. Introduction 
Deluca argues the district court erred by failing to order an updated mental 
health evaluation prior to her probation violation disposition hearing, claiming the 
mandates of I. C. § 19-2522 are applicable prior to a probation violation 
disposition hearing. (Appellant's brief, p.4.) Deluca's support for this position is 
that the Idaho Court of Appeals has previously held a district court erred by 
failing to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to J.C. § 19-2522 prior to the 
disposition of a Rule 35 motion, and that the same requirements apply to 
probation violation dispositions 
[s]ince a district court has inherent I.C.R. 35(b) authority to reduce 
a sentence previously imposed at a probation violation disposition 
hearing, the mandates of J.C. § 19-2522 were applicable to the 
distruict [sic] court at Ms. Deluca's probation violation disposition 
hearings. 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) Deluca further asserts it was an abuse of the district 
court's discretion to deny an updated mental health evaluation under I.C. § 19-
2524 where her "probation officer stated that she would benefit from" one. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.) Deluca's claims fail. Because Deluca did not 
request an evaluation prior to sentencing, I.C. § 19-2522 does not apply. 
Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant 
Deluca's motion for an updated mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2524. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"[A] court possesses discretion to order or decline to order a mental health 
examination prior to sentencing or at disposition pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524." 
State v. Hanson, 150 Idaho 729, _, 249 P.3d 1184, 1187 (Ct. App. 2011). 
C. Deluca Has Failed To Establish I.C. § 19-2522 Applies To Requests For 
Mental Health Evaluations Prior To Probation Violation Disposition 
Hearings 
Deluca asserts the district court erred in failing to grant her request to 
have an updated mental health evaluation conducted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 
prior to her probation violation disposition hearing. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) 
I.C. § 19-2522 provides for the examination of a defendant by a psychiatrist or 
licensed psychologist "[i]f there is reason to believe the mental condition of the 
defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown." 
I.C. § 19-2522(1) (emphasis added). Although Deluca did not request a mental 
health evaluation prior to sentencing in this case, she asserts the rule derived 
from State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 186 P.3d 676 (Ct. App. 2008), supports 
her position that I.C. § 19-2522 governs her situation. (Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
Deluca is incorrect. 
In Izaguirre, the Court of Appeals noted that because Izaguirre had not 
requested a psychological evaluation prior to sentencing and did not argue on 
appeal that the trial court should have ordered one sua sponte, there was "no 
claim of a direct violation of I.C. § 19-2522." 145 Idaho 820, 823, 186 P.3d 676, 
679. The Court of Appeals went on to evaluate lzaguirre's request for a 
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psychological evaluation prior to a Rule 35 hearing pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 
under an abuse of discretion standard. (J_gJ Deluca argues the district court 
should have granted her request for an updated mental health evaluation 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 because probation violation dispositions are 
analogous to Rule 35 hearings: 
The rule from Izaguirre, which enables trial court's [sic] to order an 
I.C. § 19-2522 psychological evaluation in support of an I.C.R. 35 
motion, should be applied to a request for a psychological 
evaluation prior to a probation violation disposition hearing because 
Idaho trial court's [sic] have inherent I.C.R. 35 authority when 
revoking probation [sic] there is no distinction between an exercise 
of authority under I.C.R. 35 in ether [sic] situation. 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) This argument fails because the plain language of I.C. 
§ 19-2522 provides the requirements for a mental health evaluation prepared 
prior to sentencing. 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent. Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 
(2003). Because "the best guide to legislative intent is the words of the statute 
itself," the interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the 
statute. Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 824, 828 P.2d 848, 853 
(1992); see also State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 
(2003). Where the statutory language is unambiguous, a court does not construe 
it but simply follows the law as written. McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 
142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). The plain meaning of a statute 
will therefore prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or 
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unless application of the plain language leads to absurd results. State v. Rhode, 
133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). 
LC. § 19-2522 provides for a mental health evaluation by a licensed 
professional "[i]f there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant 
will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown." The plain 
language of the statute provides that such an evaluation will be prepared prior to 
the sentencing. Had the legislature intended to apply the provisions of I.C. § 19-
2522 to probation violation disposition hearings as well as sentencing hearings, 
the necessary language could have been easily added. Such language was 
included in I.C. § 19-2524: 
When a defendant who has pied guilty to or been found guilty of a 
felony, or when a defendant who has been convicted of a felony 
has admitted to or been found to have committed a violation of a 
condition of probation, the court, prior to the sentencing hearing or 
the hearing on revocation of probation, may order the defendant to 
undergo a substance abuse assessment and/or a mental health 
examination. 
Because the plain language of I.C. § 19-2522 applies to sentencing 
hearings, it is not properly asserted in Deluca's case where her request for an 
updated mental health evaluation prior to probation violation disposition was 
denied. This is not inconsistent with Izaguirre. In that case, Izaguirre did not 
request a psychological evaluation prior to sentencing, instead waiting until 
requesting a reduction of his sentence pursuant to a Rule 35 motion to request a 
neuro-psychological evaluation. 145 Idaho 820, 823, 186 P.3d 679. The court 
found the factors relevant to such an evaluation prior to sentencing were also 
relevant in the context of a Rule 35 motion and evaluated the request under an 
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abuse of discretion standard. ~ Here, no request to update the vast amount of 
information provided to the court regarding Deluca's mental health was made 
prior to sentencing. No request for an update to her mental health evaluation 
was made by Deluca until she served a period of retained jurisdiction, was 
placed on probation, and ultimately admitted to being in violation of her 
probation. As such, the plain language of I.C. § 19-2522 is inapplicable to 
Deluca's situation. 
D. Deluca Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
By Failing To Order An Updated Mental Health Evaluation Under I.C. § 
19-2524 Prior To Her Probation Violation Disposition Hearing 
Deluca argues the district court abused its discretion by not granting her 
request for a mental health evaluation prior to her probation violation disposition 
"in light of the fact that the her [sic] probation officer stated that she would benefit 
from an updated mental health evaluation and that both the State's [sic] and her 
trial counsel addressed her mental health" at the disposition hearing. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.) Deluca further argues even though a district court 
has "a broader range of discretion" when evaluating a request for a mental health 
evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524 (in contrast to the "mandatory language" of 
I.C. § 19-2522), it must still "employ reason" when denying such a request. 
(Appellant's brief, p.13.) Here, Deluca asserts, the district court "employed no 
reasoning when it denied [her] request for a mental health evaluation." (Id.) 
Deluca was originally sentenced in August of 2009. (R., pp.91-93.) A PSI 
was prepared for that sentencing and included a great deal of information 
regarding Deluca's mental health and chemical dependency history including a 
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psychiatric evaluation from May 2007 with psychiatric progress notes through 
September 2008 (PSI, pp.41-641), Deluca's assessment, treatment plan and 
ultimate voluntary dismissal from the Walker Center (PSI, pp.65-76), and a June, 
2009 initial assessment with a licensed psychologist and medical assessment 
wherein her multiple mental health diagnoses were addressed as well as her 
medications and recommendations for continued treatment (PSI, pp.33-40). 
Deluca did not request an additional psychological examination prior to her 
sentencing. It was only after she completed the retained jurisdiction program, 
had been placed on probation and admitted to violating her probation one-year 
after her initial sentencing that she requested an "update" of her mental health 
evaluation based on an assertion that her probation officer suggested it be 
done.2 (12/13/10 Tr., p.22, L.23- p.23, L.4.) 
The district court, having the benefit of the information in the PSI regarding 
Deluca's mental health concerns and drug dependency issues, was well within its 
discretion to deny Deluca's last minute request for an update to this information. 
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524, "a court possesses discretion to order or decline to 
order a mental health examination prior to sentencing or at disposition." Hanson, 
150 Idaho at _, 249 P.3d at 1187. Additionally, the legislature's purpose 
behind giving trial courts this ability to order a mental health examination prior to 
1 The PSI contains multiple, unnumbered attachments. For ease of reference, 
the unnumbered pages have been sequentially numbered. 
2 Deluca asserts that her probation officer's desire for an updated mental health 
evaluation stems from a statement in her original PSI by the presentence 
investigator that Deluca would benefit from an updated evaluation. (Appellant's 
brief, p.7.) It is unclear how this relates to a request by counsel just over a year 
later for an updated evaluation to assist in a probation violation disposition. 
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probation violation dispositions is to "broaden[ ] a court's sentencing options 
related to the treatment for substance abuse or mental health issues." (lg_.) 
Here, the trial court had more than enough recent information about Deluca's 
mental health concerns and her chemical dependency issues to make an 
informed decision, taking into consideration any necessary treatment issues, 
where Deluca's history was well-documented in the PSI prepared only one year 
prior when Deluca had spent part of that subsequent year in the retained 
jurisdiction program and the remaining few months being closely monitored by 
her probation officer. The district court correctly determined there was no basis 
for an updated report based on its "review of the file." (12/13/2010 Tr., p.23, 
Ls.5-8.) 
Given the wealth of information previously presented to, and considered 
by, the district court in relation to Deluca's mental health and chemical 
dependency history, Deluca has failed to establish the district court abused its 
discretion in failing to order an updated mental health evaluation in this case. 
11. 
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Revoking Deluca's Probation 
A. Introduction 
Deluca asserts the district court erred in revoking her probation "in light of 
[her] rehabilitative progress." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) Deluca's claim fails. The 
district court acted well within its discretion in revoking Deluca's probation given 
her demonstrated inability to comply with the terms of probation and adequately 
rehabilitate in the community. Deluca has failed to establish otherwise. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"Once a probation violation has been proven, ... , the decision whether to 
revoke probation and impose a suspended sentence is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court." State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 985 P.2d 117 (1999) 
(citing State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 921, 854 P.2d 259, 264 (1993)). "The 
decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing 
that the court abused its discretion." State v. Lafferty. 125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 
P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct App. 1994) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 768 
P.2d 1331 (1989) and State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 758 P.2d 713 (Ct App. 
1988)). "In determining whether such an abuse occurred, the appellate inquiry 
centers on whether the sentencing court acted within the boundaries of its 
discretion, consistent with any legal standards applicable to specific choices, and 
whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Lafferty, 125 
Idaho at 381, 870 P.2d at 1340 (citation omitted). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Revoking Deluca's 
Probation 
"The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be 
rehabilitated under proper control and supervision." State v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 
853, 860, 452 P.2d 350, 357 (1969) (citing State v. Oyler, 92 Idaho 43, 436 P.2d 
706 (1968)). Relevant to the district court's probation revocation decision is 
whether probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the 
protection of society. State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct 
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App. 1988); State v. Phillips, 113 Idaho 176, 177, 742 P.2d 431,432 (Ct. App. 
1987). In answering this question, the district court may consider a wide range of 
information, including the defendant's conduct both before and during the 
probationary period. State v. Russell, 122 Idaho 488,491, 835 P.2d 1299, 1302 
(1992); State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149, 153-54, 721 P.2d 1248, 1252-53 
(1986); State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987). If 
the court reasonably concludes from the defendant's conduct that probation is 
not achieving its rehabilitative purpose, then probation may be revoked. State v. 
Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454-55, 566 P.2d 1110, 1112-13 (1977); State v. 
Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055, 772 P.2d 260, 262 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Deluca pied guilty to charges of possessing methamphetamine and injury 
to child based on her knowledge that her 16-year old daughter was using 
methamphetamine. (6/01/2009 Tr., p.28, L.3 - p.29, L.7.) At sentencing, Deluca 
had a lengthy criminal history, including a federal conviction for distribution of 
methamphetamine in 2000 for which she served two years in prison and was on 
supervised probation for three years upon her release. (PSI, pp.3-6, 11.) 
Although the presentence investigator and Deluca's trial counsel recommended 
probation, the district court sent Deluca to the retained jurisdiction program 
based on its concern with the serious nature of the offense and Deluca's lengthy 
struggle with addiction, in addition to the fact that Deluca "learned so little from 
[her] time in the federal system." (8/10/2009 Tr., p.54, L.9 - p.59, L.17.) 
Following the retained jurisdiction review period, the court placed Deluca 
on probation with a requirement, among others, that she "continue to be involved 
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in intensive outpatient treatment for dual diagnosis and for substance abuse 
issues." (2/08/2010 Tr., p.15, Ls.2-5.) Just seven months later, Deluca was 
arrested on an agent's warrant. (R., pp.110-111.) The subsequently filed 
petition for probation violation alleged Deluca was in violation of her probation for 
her continued use of methamphetamine, failing to cooperate with her probation 
officer, and being in the company of felons and/or drug users. (R., pp.123-126.) 
Deluca admitted to violating her probation by continuing to use 
methamphetamine and by failing to cooperate with probation and parole by 
refusing them access to her home to search when requested. (12/06/2010 Tr., 
p.19, Ls.11-25.) After an attempt by trial counsel to have Deluca screened for 
drug court was unsuccessful (12/13/2010 Tr., p.22, Ls.8-14), the district court 
revoked Deluca's probation and imposed her original sentence concluding that 
the opportunity Deluca was originally given for retained jurisdiction may have 
been a mistake given her prior record and "the depth of [her] involvement in the 
drug culture." (12/17/2010 Tr., p.82, Ls.7-19). The court noted the prior 
opportunities Deluca had failed to take advantage of in determining that it was 
unable to structure a probation that Deluca could be successful on: 
You then served time in federal prison. The case that 
brought you before this court was terrible. Not only were you 
involved in possession of methamphetarnine, but you were using 
with your 16-year-old daughter. 
What were you thinking to blow this chance that you got? To 
give you a rider in the first place was a major departure from what 
good sense would have indicated, based on your prior record. 
My experience has been that it is true that there comes a 
point where sometimes people who have been heavily involved in 
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the drug culture want to change and want to change directions, and 
so it was worth considering whether a rider was a good idea. 
But as I look back with the constant stream in your 
presentence reports of hanging out with people who are using 
methamphetamines, who are major serious drug users, and the 
extraordinary limits - I mean extraordinary lengths to which you've 
gone to further your own habit, the almost utter dedication of your 
life to drug use, so much so that positive impulses that one would 
expect to see of protectiveness towards a child aren't there, of 
commitment to treatment on your part, not there. 
There was progress in the rider. There was progress in that 
structure. But then you are placed on probation in February of 
2010, and then in September you were not responding when the 
probation officers are at your door. 
They are entitled to search. It's an express condition of your 
probation. You were already an iffy candidate for probation, and 
then you blew off key conditions with your probation. 
You hung out with people who are still involved with drugs. 
don't see a change in the pattern. I don't see a change in the 
pattern. I see a person who will say what she needs to say to 
continue the pattern of drug abuse that she has established in her 
life. 
(12/17/2010 Tr., p.79, L.16-p.81, L.7.) 
In light of Deluca's conduct before and during the probationary period, it 
was reasonable for the district court to conclude probation was not achieving its 
rehabilitative purpose and was not consistent with the protection of society. 
Deluca has failed to establish otherwise. 
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111. 
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Deluca's Rule 35 
Request For Leniency 
A Introduction 
Finally, Deluca asserts the district court abused its discretion when it failed 
to reduce her sentence pursuant to a Rule 35 motion seeking leniency in light of 
"new information which evince[d] a nexus between her mental health issues and 
the underlying offense." (Appellant's brief, p.20.) A review of the record does not 
show an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the denial 
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Deluca must "show that the 
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently 
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." l.g. 
C. Deluca Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion In Denying Her Rule 35 Motion For Reduction Of Sentence 
Deluca "does not allege that her sentence exceeds the statutory 
minimum," instead she argues she provided new information in support of her 
Rule 35 motion "which indicate[d] that the treatment she received for her mental 
health issues [ ] contributed to the commission of the underlying offense." 
(Appellant's brief, pp.17-18.) This purported "new information" of the interplay 
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between Deluca's mental health treatment and her drug addiction is from her 
parents and her sister who, from the record, do not appear to have medical 
training or otherwise specified expertise with which to make informed decisions 
about the cause of Deluca's addiction and continued use of illegal substances. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.18-19.) 
The district court was well aware of Deluca's lengthy history of substance 
addictions as well as her multiple mental health diagnoses and ongoing 
treatment at the time of her original sentencing, retained jurisdiction review, and 
probation violation disposition, and took them into consideration. (See generally, 
PSI.) The district court was also aware of the community and familial support 
Deluca enjoyed as well as Deluca's work history at the time of her probation 
violation disposition. (PSI, pp.9, 140-154.) None of the information provided to 
the district court in support of Deluca's Rule 35 motion was new. 
In denying Deluca's motion for reduction, the district court nevertheless 
responded to the letters from Deluca's family and friends and agreed with the 
assertion that Deluca suffered from "a disease which warrants treatment" (R., 
p.185.) However, the court concluded the sentence as imposed was necessary 
in light of all of the surrounding circumstances. (Id.) 
Because Deluca failed to present any "new" information in support of her 
request for Rule 35 relief, she has failed to establish the district court abused its 
discretion in not reducing her sentence. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order 
revoking Deluca's probation. 
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